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Introduction
　There can be no doubt that current federal budgeting has been dysfunctional, and the 
dysfunction has been caused by polarized partisan conﬂicts. Recent budgeting reform pro-
posals, including the one incorporated into the Budget Control Act of 2011 （BCA）, are the 
result of the desperation for eﬀective political decision-making with Washington. Conserva-
（　　）
＊ 　I would greatly acknowledge the many debts I owe in the course of writing up this paper. James D. 
Savage, Professor of Budgeting, University of Virginia, read through the draft and made acute and 
helpful comments, including several appropriate corrections in detail. Leslie Furlong, a brilliant ESL 
teacher of the Thomas Jeﬀerson Adult and Career Education and a knowledgeable anthropologist, 
made an exciting opportunity to discuss around the draft. Although the paper owes much to their 
help, responsibility for anything that is said in the paper is only to me.
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tives, relying on the theory of “starve the beast”, have tried to deprive the president and 
the Congress of their discretion of budgetary power, by introducing forceful budgetary 
tools. These include enforcing statutory debt limits, supporting a constitutional amendment 
to require a balanced budget, and setting spending limits and applying sequestration. 
These proposals have not only been asserted by conservatives. Many moderates or liberals, 
described by White ［2013］ as “centrist budget hawks”, also have sympathized and support-
ed the use of automatically enforcement mechanisms
1）
.
　However, the more tightened ﬁscal norms have become, as supported by both conserva-
tive and liberal ﬁscal hawks, the less functioning ordinary budgeting has become. The bud-
getary process is more improvisational, and as the result the current budget is far less ﬁs-
cally sustainable over the long-term. How should we think of the gap between the ideal of 
ﬁscal responsibility and what current ﬁscal policy has produced ? In order to consider and 
ﬁx these issues, it might be useful to approach to them through the following two perspec-
tives.
　The ﬁrst approach examines the relationship between budgeting rules and “political will.” 
As I said, recent proposals on budgeting reform have been based on the recognition of po-
litical failures. For those who hold this view, which is accepted by most political scientists, 
the concept of “political will” looks so unpopular. Contrary to their view, in traditional bud-
geting theory political decision-making by political actors is superior to a reliance on bud-
geting by automatic rules （Meyers ［2014］）. As Jim Nussle, former Chairman of the House 
Budget Committee, said, budgeting is just the tool, and what’s the matter is the human as 
politician who uses that tool （U. S. House ［2011］ : 5―6）. Although we should not attribute 
all these current problems to “political will,” we also have to remember the limits of the 
budgeting rules. In other words, we need to support the approach that views better deci-
sion-making through deliberative action to be superior to an excessive dependence on bud-
geting rules. Budgetary reform should not remove discretionary action and politics from 
the budgetary process.
　The second perspective is the theoretical distinction between micro-budgeting and macro-
budgeting. Micro-budgeting means the goal to achieve the optimal allocation of budgetary 
resources to governmental agencies or functions. Key ［1940］ deﬁnes “the basic budgeting 
problem” is that “on what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A in-
stead of activity B.” As he said, the logic of micro-budgeting is essential of budgeting, and 
it precedes macro-budgeting historically and theoretically. Contrary to it, macro-budgeting 
means the goal of attaining long-term ﬁscal sustainability, referring to aggregates of spend-
ing and revenue, or budget balance. That is to say, we have two goals in budgeting : Mi-
cro-budgeting to allocate government resource and macro-budgeting to implement ﬁscal 
norm.
　Historically, macro-budgeting as a rule has emerged in both theory and practice begin-
（　　）
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ning with the enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 （CBA
2）
）. With greater concern for controlling climbing budget deﬁcits, the legislators 
have invented and developed the various macro-budgeting tools using them to restrain the 
traditional micro-budgeting practice. Theorists in budgeting also have focused on the role 
of macro-budgeting, and discussed its relationship with micro-budgeting （LeLoup ［1988］, 
Schick ［1987］）.
　In this paper, I explore the characteristics of federal budgeting under the BCA, focusing 
on the above two perspectives. First, I look at the historical development of the micro-mac-
ro relationship in budgeting since the CBA : the ﬁscal norms found in the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deﬁcit Control Act of 1985, better known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
（GRH）, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 （BEA）. Second, I examine the two major 
tools devised into budgeting under the BCA ; the use of the statutory debt limit, and the 
CAP and sequestration of discretionary spending. Third, I consider the eﬀects of the tools 
on the traditional appropriation process, or the main process of micro-budgeting in the U. S. 
federal budget, and on the ﬁscal sustainability, the goal of macro-budgeting. Based upon 
these examinations, I will show the view of the problems to be solved around the current 
budgeting under BCA and the better way of budgeting reform.
１．Two Types of Macro-Budgeting : the GRH and the BEA
１―１　From the GRH to the BEA
　In a hearing held by the House Budget Committee soon after the enactment of the BCA, 
Philip Joyce sorted out the congressional historical approaches to deﬁcit reduction as exem-
pliﬁed by two types of legislation : the GRH approach and the BEA approach （U. S. House 
［2011］: 16―17）. The GRH enacted in law in 1985 set the deﬁcit reduction target, reducing 
it by 36 billion dollar in each ﬁscal year from FY 1987 to FY 1991, with the goal of balanc-
ing the budget in FY 1991. If Congress could not bring appropriations within the spending 
target, automatic spending cuts called sequestration would be triggered forcedly under the 
GRH. However, the GRH did not work well. Confronted with the threat of sequestration, 
Congress managed to avoid triggering sequestration through the use of various gimmicks. 
Some program were excluded from the target, other program accounts were transferred 
into the next ﬁscal year. When Congress recognized that it could not attain the target 
even by using gimmicks, it extended the target into the future. Finally, Congress terminat-
ed the GRH without attaining the balanced budget that the GRH aimed to achieve.
　After failing to reduce the deﬁcit, the GRH was replaced by the Budget Enforcement 
Act （BEA）, which was inserted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, a huge 
bipartisan deﬁcit reduction package. As showed in Figure 1, the budgetary control under 
（　　）
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the BEA settled the separate enforcement mechanisms between discretionary spending and 
mandatory spending, including revenue, instead of the deﬁcit reduction target under the 
GRH.
　First, under the BEA, the spending ceiling, called a CAP, used to control discretionary 
spending. Discretionary spending refers to the program expenditures appropriated in the 
twelve appropriation bills fund the federal government’s agencies every ﬁscal year. As 
compared to the deﬁcit reduction targets set by the GRH, the CAP under the BEA was 
determined by bipartisan agreement between Congress and the president, and the total 
amount of the CAP was ﬁne-tuned through the economic forecasts that Congressional Bud-
get Oﬃce （CBO） and Oﬃce of Management and Budget （OMB） released. In other words, 
the CAP in the BEA took account of economic cyclical change, contrary to the target of 
the GRH, which was mechanical and did not consider cyclical factors.
　Second, the new budgetary control tool called Pay As You Go （PAYGO） was applied to 
mandatory spending and revenue. Mandatory spending, also called entitlements, refers to 
the uncontrollable program expenditures, such as funding for Social Security retirement 
and Medicare. PAYGO under the BEA was the rule that new programs or revision with 
mandatory spending increases or revenue decreases must be oﬀset by spending decreases 
or revenue increases from other programs. PAYGO aimed to restrain new entitlement pro-
grams and tax cuts.
１―２　Distinction of the GRH Approach and the BEA Approach
　While both of the GRH and the BEA are the macro-budgetary tools in order to reduce 
the deﬁcit, Joyce accurately summarize the diﬀerence of the both approach as the follow-
ing. He said that “it （the BEA approach） focused on the policy actions ﬁrst and then used 
the budget process to attempt to enforce compliance with those actions. That is, to try to 
keep the Congress from undoing the decisions that had previously been made
3）
.” Contrary 
to it, there was no policy agreement, but just the enforcement rule in the GRH approach.
（　　）
Figure 1 : Summary of Budgetary Controll in BEA
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　When we try to apply the characteristic by Joyce to the BCA, we can ﬁnd that the deﬁ-
cit reduction scheme settled in the BCA is more similar to the GRH approach than the 
BEA’s, because budget makers have been deprived of their political discretion by the strict 
macro-budgeting rules under the BCA （Refer to Table 1）. The deﬁcit reduction scheme 
under the BCA is composed of two methods : statutory debt limit and the CAP with se-
questration. I will consider the characteristics of them in the following section.
２．The Macro-Budgeting Methods in the BCA
２―１　Statutory Debt Limit
　The statutory debt limit is a law that limits the total amount of federal debt that can be 
incurred by the federal government― including the debt held by the public and the federal 
government itself. The Department of the Treasury cannot issue the Treasury bond great-
er than the statutory debt limit. If the debt outstanding level was approached to the legal 
debt limit and the Treasury could not issue additional Treasury bonds, the federal govern-
ment would not only be in shut-down through the shortage of cash, but it would also go 
to default. As a result, the government’s default would tremendously damage the world’s 
economy through the resulting free-fall in the value of the Treasury bond. Congress, there-
fore, has almost always passed the legislation needed to raise the statutory debt limit un-
conditionally and de-facto automatically.
Making the BCA and the Debt Limit
　After the mid-term election in 2010, the Republican Party （GOP） that retook the majori-
ty in House of Representatives used the statutory debt limit as a hostage to force Obama 
and the congressional Democrats to sit down at the negotiation table to address the huge 
deﬁcit and to consider spending reductions. At that time, the federal debt level approached 
the debt limit of 14.3 trillion dollars, and the Congress and the president had to raise it 
（　　）
Table 1 : The Comparison of the Fiscal Rules in GRH, BEA, and BCA
GRH BEA BCA
Beforehand Agree-
ment on Deﬁcit 
Reduction in 
Program Based
No Yes No
The Target of 
Deﬁcit Reduction
Absolute Amount 
of Deﬁcit
Ex Post Facto 
Control on Spend-
ing and Revenue
Absolute Amount 
of CAP in Discre-
tionary Spending
The Distinction 
between Cyclical 
and Structurral 
Deﬁcit
No Yes No
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urgently （Figure 2）. John Boehner, Speaker of House, declared the principle that the 
amount the debt limit was raised must be equal to the total amount of deﬁcit reduction. 
This principle was named “the Boehner Rule.”
　The linkage of the debt limit with deﬁcit reduction turned the budget process into the 
exhausting and unreconciled repetition of negotiation. The repetitive and multi-level biparti-
san negotiations, from the Biden Commission to the higher-level conference between 
Boehner and President Obama, all resulted in failure, because of polarized politics : the GOP 
stuck to entitlement cuts and refused to accept any tax increases, while Obama and the 
congressional Democrats refused to concessions on protecting entitlements but they repeat-
edly demanded tax increases. After all options collapsed, a jerry-built and patch-worked 
package was introduced and passed as the BCA. The agreement came just one day before 
the default dead line Treasury Secretary Geithner had declared several months ago （Wood-
ward ［2012］. Also refer to Table 2）.
　The deﬁcit reduction scheme inserted into the BCA resulted in poorer outcomes than 
that the participants on the negotiation had expected. The size of the deﬁcit reduction that 
（　　）
Figure 2 : The Statutory Debt Limit and Federal Debt Outstanding
＊The Period painted in grey means the suspension term of the statutory debt limit.
Source :  U. S. Department of Treasury, Bureau of the Public Debt, Monthly Statement of the Public Debt, 
various issues : Jan. 2001-Dec. 2015.
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（　　）
Table 2 : Timeline of Making the BCA and Its Aftermath
Year Month/Date PL
2010
2―Nov Mid-term election : GOP retakes House.
10―Dec The Bowls and Simpson Commission releases the report.
17―Dec Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. 111
―312
2011
14―Feb President’s budget for FY 2012.
13―Apr Obama’s new budget plan : 4 trillion reduction over 12 years.
14―Apr Full year Continuing Appropriation for FY 2011 is enacted. 112―10
15―Apr House releases budget resolution : 4 trillion reduction over 10 years.
5―May Biden Commission’s ﬁrst meeting.
11―May Boehner Declares “Boehgner Rule.”
22―Jun The ﬁrst top negotiation between Obama and Boeigner.
23―Jun Biden Commission breaks down due to Canter’s exit.
22―Jul Obama-Boeigner negotiation breaks down due to Boeigner’s exit.
29―Jul House GOP Version of BCA Passes in House ; Fails in Seanate.
Senate Democrat Version of BCA Passes in Senate ; Failed in House.
31―Jul Biden, Reed and McCornell agree on the alternative plan.
BCA ﬁnal version Introduces into both of Congress.
2―Aug Obama signs in BCA. 112―25
The ﬁrst raise in the statutory debt limit under BCA.
5―Aug S&P decredits US treasury bond.
22―Sep The second raise in statutory debt limit under BCA.
21―Nov Super Committee abandons to release the report.
23―Dec Consolidated Appropriation Act for FY 2012. 112―23
2012
18―Jan The Third raise in statutory debt limit.
General election of President and Congress : Obama’s reelection.
2013
2―Jan ATRA : Avoiding “ﬁscal cliﬀ”. 112―240
4―Feb No Pay No Budget Act : The suspension of debt limit. 113―3
1―Mar Sequestered to FY 2013 discresionary spending.
26―Mar Omnibus Appropriation Act of FY 2013. 113―6
1―Oct The federal government shut-down : until Oct. 16.
17―Oct Continuing Resolution for FY 2014 : Stopping shut-down. 113―46
26―Dec Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. 113―67
2014
17―Jan Omnibus Appropriation Act of FY 2014.
15―Feb Extention of suspension on debt limit till Mar. 15, 2015. 113―83
7―Nov Mid-term election : GOP gets majority in both of Congress.
16―Dec Omnibus Appropriation Act of FY 2015. 113―235
2015
30―Apr Both of congress passes the budget resolution for FY 2016.
28―Sep Boehner declares to resign of the Speaker.
29―Oct Paul Ryan is elected into the Speaker of House.
2―Nov Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. 114―74
18―Dec Omnibus Appropriation Act of FY 2016. 114―113
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was to be made cutting discretionary spending was based on the tentative agreement 
reached during the early negotiations held by the Biden Commission. The rest of the re-
duction was to be determined by a Super Committee. However, the Super Committee 
abandoned eﬀorts to produce an agreement that would produce the additional spending 
cuts and revenue increases need to reach an agreement. The Super Committee’s failure 
meant that the discretionary spending would alone bear the burden of deﬁcit reduction. In 
these ways, the linkage between the size of the government’s debt and the size of budget 
reduction created the deﬁcit reduction scheme nobody had expected and led them to a 
state of political confusion.
The Debt Limit Politics in the Aftermath of the BCA
　The brinkmanship politics that surrounded the debt limit was not conﬁned to the mak-
ing of the BCA. The political battle surrounding the debt limit continues to be replaced in 
the debates on the government’s budgetary process.
　In the end of 2012, just after Obama’s reelection, the outstanding of federal debt again 
approached the statutory debt limit. To cope with it, the Congress and the president man-
aged to pass the No Budget No Pay Act of 2013 on Feb. 2013. However, the law has 
changed the way the government approaches the debt limit issue. Instead of raising the 
statutory debt limit, the law suspended its enforcement until May 19, 2013. During the sus-
pension, the Treasury Department was permitted to issue the Treasury bond uncondition-
ally, and the total amount of debt on the end of the suspension term became the new debt 
limit, if Congress and the president would not set the new debt limit during the suspen-
sion （Austin ［2015］: 9―11）. By this change in the way of dealing with the debt limit, Con-
gress has transferred its authority to set the debt limit to the Treasury. The change 
means that budget makers failed to agree on raising the debt limit at all.
　After the enactment of the No Budget No Pay Act, the following cycle about the debt 
limit has become the standard form : First, the suspension term ends without any new leg-
islation to raise the statutory debt limit. Second, the Treasury Secretary declares the debt 
outstanding at that time as the new debt limit, and simultaneously, Treasury enters into 
the extraordinary measures to coping with the shortage of government fund. Third, Trea-
sury Secretary reports the deadline by which its extraordinary measures ends. Fourth, the 
Congress and the president pass a law that determines the new suspension term until the 
deadline in order to avoid default.
　The Congress and the president have settled three times about the suspension of the 
debt limit, including the No Budget No Pay Act （refer to Figure 2）. Now, we are on the 
third suspension period that will expire in May 2017, just after the new president and the 
new congressional members will take into the oﬃce. In these way, the time bomb of the 
debt limit to avoid government default has been incorporated into the periodical budget 
（　　）
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process. The suspension or raising the debt limit has become must-pass legislation.
２―２　CAP and Sequestration
CAP in the BCA
　The BCA set the spending limit on discretionary spending, the CAP, from FY 2013 to 
FY2021 （the line in Figure 3）. As the Super Committee failed to make the extra deﬁcit 
（　　）
Figure 3 ⑵ : CAP in Discretionary Spending under the BCA （Non-Defense）
Source :  U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Budget ［2011］ Concurrent Resolution on the 
Budget : Fiscal Year 2012, Report 112―58, Apr. 11, pp. 33―35.
　　　　 CRS  ［2014］ The Budget Control Act and Trends in Discretionary Spending, Apr. 2, 
RL34424, pp. 15―16 .
　　　　 CBO ［2015］ An Update : Budget and Economic Outlook, p. 78.
　　　　 CBO ［2014］ An Update : Budget and Economic Outlook, p. 14.
　　　　 OMB ［2015］ OMB Sequestration Update Report to the President and Congress for Fis-
cal Year 2016, Aug. 20, pp. 4―5.
　　　　 U. S. House ［2015］  Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 : Section-by-Section Summary, Oct., 
pp. 1―2.
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Figure 3 ⑴ : CAP in Discretionary Spending under the BCA （Defense）
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reduction package, an additional CAP named the Super Committee CAP was imposed on 
discretionary spending （the gray bar in Figure 3）. The CAP, including the Super Commit-
tee CAP, was imposed separately on defense and non-defense discretionary spending. If 
Congress failed to make appropriation within the CAP, the sequestration process would be 
triggered. In this case, all discretionary programs would be cut across the board.
　The scheme of the CAP was created by the BEA of 1990. However, the CAP in the 
BCA is utterly deferent from the one in BEA. First, the original CAP in the BEA was 
based upon the prior agreement of how to attain the deﬁcit reduction goal on each pro-
gram level. By comparison, the CAP in the BCA had no plans on how to reach the target, 
especially if the Super Committee CAP did so. In other words, while the CAP in the BEA 
was the rule for Congress and the president to act in compliance with the budget agree-
ment between them, the activation of the CAP in the BCA was the result of their failure 
to reach an agreement. The CAP in the BCA, therefore, was a device created to weigh on 
budget makers who lacked any plan to reduce the deﬁcit.
　Second, the CAP in the BEA distinguished between cyclical deﬁcits and structural ones. 
It was applied only to structural deﬁcits, as the amount of the spending limit was ﬁne-
tuned through the economic estimates by OMB and CBO. By contrast, the CAP in the 
BCA was the absolute number, without any considerations of economic changes and any 
ﬂexibility.
The Threat of Sequestration
　Sequestration, rooted in the GRH, was another enforcement tool that nobody involved in 
making the budget desired to be triggered. Sequestration was inserted in the BCA so that 
the extra deﬁcit reduction package by the Super Committee would have been successful 
into a law. According to Woodward ［2013］, Jack Lew, the Director of OMB, and Robert 
Nabors, the Director of legislative aﬀairs of the White House, talked about the aim of se-
quester, when they were managing to make the ﬁnal version of the BCA. “It （sequestra-
tion） is so ridiculous,” they said, “that no one ever wants it to happen. It was the bomb 
that no one wanted to drop. It actually would be an action-forcing event
4）
.”
　Both Democratic and Republican leaders jumped on their idea because they thought that 
the tremendous threat of sequestration would make the members of the Super Committee 
act on the hard task of deﬁcit reduction, lead them to make the bill, and get the legislators 
enact it into the law without any amendment. However, this tremendous threat that nobody 
had wanted was realized because the Super Committee failed to reach any agreement.
２―３　Characteristics of the BCA : Brinkmanship and Autonomy Oriented Budgeting
　As we saw the previous chapter, Joyce accurately pointed out the diﬀerence between 
the GRH approach and the BEA’s to deﬁcit reduction in the context of the relationship be-
（　　）
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tween the ﬁscal norm and political discretion. He discussed that setting target without si-
multaneously reaching consensus was likely to be an empty promise, and that the enforce-
ment rule should prioritize political decision-making and should be used to enforce 
compliance with it （U. S. House ［2011］ : 17―18）.
　However, when evaluating the BCA scheme, Joyce’s assertion remained in generalities. 
When it came time to discuss the speciﬁc reforms included in the BCA, he focused on the 
comprehensiveness of the target. He said that the problem of the GRH was that many 
parts of the budget were excluded from enforcement, and this was also true with the BCA 
（U. S. House ［2011］ : 18）. Based on his point out, the defect of the BCA would be caused 
by narrow target scope, and the right way to reform would be to widen the coverage of 
enforcement rules, such as the CAP or sequestration, into revenue clauses or entitlements. 
However, the cause of the problems does not lie with how to use the rules in a technical 
way, but with the rules themselves.
　The essential problem of the ﬁscal norm under the BCA, such as the linking the debt 
limit to deﬁcit reduction, the CAP, or sequestration, results in the outcome where budget-
makers forcefully turn to brinkmanship politics, and that these tools incentivize them to 
rely on autonomic procedures to make diﬃcult choices. How have these rules changed the 
nature of budgeting ? In the next chapter, I will examine the impact of the ﬁscal norm un-
der the BCA on the budget process in both micro-and macro-budgeting.
Note
1）　For example, moderate or liberal think tanks, such as the Committee for Responsible Federal 
Budget, the Bipartisan Policy Center, Peterson-Pew Commission, have released a variety of re-
ports that has proposed the strict budget enforcement procedures for legislators to take re-
sponsibility for deﬁcit reduction.
2）　As James Savage asserted, concern about macro-budgeting has had much longer history 
since the Foundation, typically it has been expressed as the thought of balanced budget （Sav-
age ［1988］ : 4）. In this paper, however, I use the term of macro-budgeting as institutionalized 
rules related to deﬁcit reduction. According to this view, it can be say that Congress has es-
tablished the institution of macro-budgeting since the CBA of 1974.
3）　In addition, Joyce pointed out another diﬀerence between both approaches. That is, while the 
BEA created separate enforcement regimes between discretionary spending and entitlements, 
the GRH did not distinguish both （U. S. House ［2011］ : 17）.
4）　Woodward ［2012］ : 327. It has been in dispute who invented the idea of sequestration. While 
Sargent ［2013］ and Bernstein ［2013］ have asserted the idea of sequester was rooted from the 
House GOP, based upon the statement by Speaker Boehner or Paul Ryan, the chairman of the 
Budget Committee in House, Woodward ［2013］ has denied their view, revealing the staﬀs of 
the White House introduced it ﬁrst, based on his book, as showed in the paper.
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